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Abstract
Costa and Shrapnel [2016] have recently proposed an interventionist theory of
quantum causation. The formalism generalises the classical methods of Pearl
[2000] and allows for the discovery of quantum causal structure via localised
interventions. Classical causal structure is presented as a special case of this more
general framework. I introduce the account and consider whether this formalism
provides a causal explanation for the Bell correlations.
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1 Introduction
It is notoriously di cult to apply causal theory to systems involving quantum
phenomena. Entanglement correlations between space-like separated systems seem to
defy causal explanation, and it seems near impossible to produce an account that avoids
the di culties posed by non-locality, contextuality, and the measurement problem. In
the last thirty years or so, philosophers have advocated a number of fixes, arguing for
non-local common causes (Sua´rez and San Pedro [2011]; Egg and Esfeld [2014]),
non-screening o↵ common causes (Butterfield [1992]) and ‘uncommon’ common causes
(Hofer-Szabo´ et al. [2013]; Naeger [2015]). Others have argued for more exotic solutions
such as retro-causation (Evans et al. [2013]) and super-determinism (’t Hooft [2009]).
All of these approaches share a common theme. Roughly speaking, one starts with
quantum correlations (usually the Bell correlations), applies classical causal
methodology, identifies a contradiction and then decides what has to go. For
interventionist accounts, the dilemma is presented as a choice between relinquishing one
of two assumptions: the Causal Markov Condition or faithfulness (no-fine-tuning).1 The
unfortunate consequence of giving up such assumptions, however, is that it becomes
unclear why the resulting explanation ought to be thought of as causal.
Glymour [2006], Naeger [2015] and Wood and Spekkens [2015] have recently analysed
quantum correlations using classical causal modelling methods. Glymour considers the
problem to lie with the Causal Markov Condition, whereas Naeger takes aim at the
other pillar of causal modelling and advocates that we simply accept unfaithful causal
models. Wood and Spekkens suggest that rather than trying to modify one of the
existing assumptions, one should reject the classical causal methodology tout court and
instead focus on developing an explicitly quantum generalisation. We shall look more
1Roughly, the Causal Markov Condition states that the causal structure of a set of
variables entails a set of conditional independence statements satisfied by the joint
distribution over these variables. Faithfulness states that the joint probability
distribution satisfies only these conditional independencies.
2
closely at these suggestions in Section 3.
When faced with the peculiarities of quantum correlations, a well worn alternative is
to consider how quantum theory forces one to think of the world, in more general terms.
Everett-style interpretations, de-Broglie-Bohm theory and Collapse models all fit within
this kind of approach: the aim is not to address certain preconceptions we may have
regarding causation, but rather certain preconceptions we may have regarding ontology.
For adherents to such interpretations, particularly in light of Russell’s eliminativist
attack on causation (Russell [1912]), the desire for a specifically causal explanation for
quantum correlations may perhaps seem a little unmotivated.2 However, for those
philosophers interested in interventionist conceptions of causation, the former approach
certainly remains worth investigating. It is clear that actual experimental and
theoretical practice in quantum physics utilises concepts of manipulation and control.3
Prima facie, it seems an account of quantum interventionist causation ought to be
possible. Thus, the question becomes whether one can in fact give a formal account of
interventionist causation that correctly accounts for quantum correlations. Ideally, one
which recovers classical interventionist causal structure in an appropriate limit. The
explanatory power of classical interventionist causal methodology can then be seen as a
special case of a more fundamental version, rather than something requiring direct
modification.
The recent work of Costa and Shrapnel [2016] is an attempt to provide a consistent
formalism that correctly captures quantum causal structure defined along such
interventionist lines. Whether this account gives one a causal explanation of the Bell
correlations depends, of course, on the manner in which one prefers to define causal
relations. Nonetheless, understanding what quantum mechanics has to teach us about
2Although, Brown and Timpson [2014] discuss an Everettian interpretation of the
Bell experiment that is local, using non-separability to retain the spirit of Reichenbach’s
common cause principle.
3See, for example, (Wiseman and Milburn [2010]).
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causation has inspired much hair pulling on the part of both philosophers and physicists
in the past: here, at the very least, is a fresh perspective on this old problem.4
On a more cautionary note, it is worth saying at the outset that this paper is not an
attempt to present a particular metaphysical view of fundamental physics. There are
many philosophers who believe that physics in general is inhospitable to the existence of
causal relations. Problems include the fact that the variables of fundamental physics are
not coarse-grained (Woodward [2007]), that physical theories are time symmetric (Farr
and Reutlinger [2013], Russell [1912]) and that fundamental physics aims at
universality. Roughly speaking, this Russellian view comes in two flavours: (i) those
who think there is no room for causation in the fundamental physical ontology of the
world, but concede that causal talk is used, and indeed useful, and (ii) those
eliminativists who think fundamental physics leaves no room for the existence of causal
facts simpliciter. I believe the second view can be challenged by a mature theory of
interventionism and convincing counterarguments have already been presented. Frisch
[2014] has recently produced a book-length defence of the utility of causal talk in the
practice of fundamental physics, and Ismael [forthcoming] also takes a broadly
anti-eliminativist line on causation and physics. Having said that, those looking for
detailed arguments for, or against, the Russellian view will not find them here.
The paper is structured as follows: First, I present the interventionist account of
causal explanation and discuss how the formalism (as it currently stands) fails to
explain quantum phenomena. Second, I consider why one may wish to produce a causal
account of quantum phenomena. Third, I introduce the quantum causal modelling
framework of Costa and Shrapnel [2016]. Finally, I consider the implications this has for
a causal understanding of the Bell correlations.
4A roughly similar approach is taken by Fenton-Glynn and Kroedel [2015]: they
extend a particular philosophical theory of causation (the Lewisian counterfactual
account) to provide a causal account of the Bell correlations. These authors conclude,
contra the finding of this paper, that there is a direct causal relationship between
space-like separated wings of a Bell experiment.
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2 Classical causal models.
In virtue of what, exactly, is a causal model a representation of causal structure? For
many interventionists this is primarily a pragmatic matter. Causal models enable one to
identify e↵ective strategies by distinguishing between probabilistic correlations that are
due to causes and those that are merely accidental. Nancy Cartwright [1979] was
arguably the first to clearly articulate the importance of this distinction in her paper
‘Causal Laws and E↵ective Strategies’. She was arguing against the eliminativist
element of Russell’s argument: for her “causal laws cannot be done away with, for they
are needed to ground the distinction between e↵ective strategies and ine↵ective ones”
(p420). For example, knowing that the mercury level and the onset of snow are
correlated does not tell us whether turning the thermometer upside down will prevent
snow. It is causal information that allows us to determine the right action in this
situation.
In the last thirty years this basic idea has developed into a sophisticated account of
causation known as interventionism. What distinguishes causal from merely
correlational relations, is that the former can be modified via localised interventions.
Roughly, C is a cause of E when manipulating C in the right way can bring about a
change in E (or the probability distribution of E). The representational tool of choice
for the computer scientists, statisticians and philosophers who utilise this theory is the
causal model, a graphical structure that has found application across a wide range of
disciplines.
For the interventionist, causal models are vehicles for learning about the manipulable
elements of the world. It is therefore relevant to ask how one ought to think of the
relations and relata of these models. Are they to be considered merely as
agent-dependent projections (Price [2013])), inherently perspectival (Price [2007]) and
ontologically deflationary (Price and Menzies [1993])? Or is it possible to maintain an
objective, agent-independent account (Woodward [2003], [2007]) and suggest that
causal models may have some (however thin) ontological significance (Woodward
[2015])? While disparate positions have recently been brought somewhat closer (Ismael
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[2015]), these kinds of metaphysical questions are far from settled.
A number of authors have contributed in important ways to the development of
causal modelling, notably Spirtes et al. [2000], Woodward [2003] and Pearl [2000]. We
shall follow the physicists here and use Pearl’s account to focus our discussion. The
relata of causal models are typically classical random variables X1, .., Xn. It is assumed
that each variable can be associated with a range of ‘values’: properties that we can
unambiguously reveal by measurement or direct observation. Such variables can be
binary and used to represent the occurrence or otherwise of an event, can take on a
finite range of values or have values that are continuous.5 It is generally assumed that
the properties that these values represent are non-contextual (in the sense of quantum
contextuality) and exist prior to, and independently of the act of measurement or
observation.6 7 Ultimately, these values represent the point of contact between the
model and the world.
It is assumed that the joint probability distribution taken over the variables of the
system is generated by its ‘causal structure’, with the structure formed by deterministic
causal mechanisms acting between variables, plus some added noise. Such causal
structure is represented via a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where the structure of the
DAG is assumed isomorphic to the network of autonomous causal mechanisms. When
one passively observes the system (collects data samples without setting variables to
particular values), one is given a window into certain aspects of this structure; when one
intervenes on the system (some of the data instances correspond to cases where
5As is the convention, capital letters (X1, X2...) will be associated with particular
variables, and lower case letters with particular variable values (xi, xj...).
6Very roughly, contextuality means that the value of the observed property depends
on the way it is observed, or on which other properties are observed together with it.
See (Kochen and Specker [1967]) for an introduction to quantum contextuality and
(Spekkens [2005]) for a more modern perspective.
7Clearly, this very intuitive starting point is deeply problematic in the quantum case.
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particular variables in the network are set to specific values) typically one gains further
information about the structure. It is the latter possibility of causal discovery via local
interventions that ties the causal modelling framework to Cartwright’s original insight.
The ultimate goal of such models is to give the user a handle on the manipulable
elements of the world: to provide a guide to future action. These ideas are made more
precise via the Causal Bayesian Networks (CBN) formalism.
A CBN is an ordered triple hV,G, P i. V is the set of variables, G a DAG and P a
joint probability distribution over the variables V . The graph captures the causal
relationships between the variables, with the nodes of the graph being the variables in
V and the arrows between them representing causal mechanisms.8 The CBN is defined
by a list of conditional dependencies, one for each variable given its graphical parents
(P (Xi|Pa(Xi)). These conditional distributions are sometimes known as the ‘causal
parameters’ of the graph and are considered to be generated by the autonomous causal
mechanisms acting between variables, plus some unmodelled noise. Parentless variables
are associated with marginal distributions.
A CBN is associated with a joint probability distribution taken over all the model
variables by applying the product rule to these local conditional distributions:
P (X1, ..Xn) =
Y
i
P (Xi|Pa(Xi)) (1)
Sometimes equation 1 is called the Causal Markov Condition. However, there is no
reason to suppose that such a factorisation would result in any specifically causal
information, unless one commits to the existence of autonomous causal mechanisms and
the possibility of discovery (and verification) of causal structure via local intervention.
So, whilst the CMC is often represented mathematically as equation 1, the causal
8Some basic terminology is useful: a variable A is a ‘parent’ of B when there is a
single arrow from A to B. In such a situation B is a ‘child’ of A. A is an ‘ancestor’ of B
when there is a ‘directed path’ of several linked arrows from A to B, in such a case B is
a ‘descendant’ of A.
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information of a DAG is perhaps better encoded in the conditional probability:
P (x1, . . . , xn|i1, . . . , iN) =
nY
j=1
P (xj|paj, ij), (2)
where ij represents the values of (external) intervention variables used to test the causal
structure. Equation 2 reduces to equation 1 when Ij = idle for all j. That is, for the
observational, ‘naturally generated’ distribution.
Defining the assumptions required to discover causal structure when one can’t
condition on experimental interventions has been a core focus for the last two decades.
In many situations, intervening is di cult for pragmatic or ethical reasons but one may
nonetheless still wish to answer interventional queries. In such situations, two key
assumptions underly the methods used to learn causal structure from observational
data: the Causal Markov Condition (CMC) and faithfulness.
Recall, the Causal Markov Condition states that the causal structure of a set of
variables entails a set of conditional independence statements satisfied by the joint
distribution. When a causal structure is represented graphically via a directed acyclic
graph (DAG), and satisfies the CMC, children are conditionally independent of their
non-descendants, given their parents. One can think of it as a generalisation of
Reichenbach’s ‘screening o↵’ condition (Reichenbach [1956]).
Faithfulness, on the other hand, states that the joint probability distribution satisfies
only these conditional independencies. Also known as ‘no fine-tuning’, faithfulness
implies that the only conditional independencies in the distribution are those that hold
for any set of causal parameters. The idea here is that one does not wish to allow for
‘accidental’ independencies that are created when causal paths cancel, or when certain
symmetries exist for a subset of particular causal parameters.9 An alternative way to
understand the importance of faithfulness is to consider that for any distribution it is
possible to construct a complete graph (where every node is connected to every other
9See (Eberhardt [2013]) for some good examples of unfaithful models, and (Zhang
and Spirtes [2015]) for a taxonomy of various varieties and recent progress.
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node) that is Markovian to the distribution, by fine-tuning the causal parameters. To
avoid such possibilities one asks that the graph is both Markov and faithful to the
distribution.10
Pearl has developed two well known algorithms that take as input a list of conditional
independencies (found in a joint distribution over a given set of variables) and return a
set of DAG’s as output. The IC algorithm will return a DAG, under the assumptions of
causal Markovianity, faithfulness and causal su ciency (no unmeasured common
causes). The IC* algorithm does not require the assumption of causal su ciency, but
will in general only return a partial ancestral graph (PAG): a DAG with any number of
undirected edges. Including the possibility of latent variables (unmeasured common
causes) significantly complicates the task of discovering causal structure from empirical
sets containing purely observational data.11
Underlying Pearl’s picture of causation is the further assumption that joint
probability distributions that do not permit a Markovian, faithful representation are
always a consequence of unmeasured common causes (latent variables). In principle,
locating and measuring such variables ought to restore Markovianity to the model for
some causal structure. Pearl sees this as a significant strength of the formalism:
The Markov condition guides us in deciding when a set of parents Pa(Xi) is
considered complete, in the sense that it includes ALL the relevant
immediate causes of Xi. It permits us to leave some of the causes out of
10Some authors ask that the graph be Markov and faithful to the distribution, others
that the distribution be Markov and faithful to the graph. The distinction is irrelevant
for what I have to say, and merely reflects the di↵erent directions in which one can
apply the methods: one can start with empirical data and attempt to construct a
graph, or start with a graph and check that the statistics match.
11In simultaneous and independent work, Peter Spirtes and Clarke Glymour
developed equivalent algorithms to IC and IC*: the PC and FCI algorithms. See
(Glymour [2016]) for a short and accessible history of the field.
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Pa(Xi) (to be summarised as probabilities), but not if they also influence
other variables modelled in the system. If a set Pa(Xi) is too narrow, there
will be disturbance terms that influence several variables simultaneously,
and the Markov property will be lost. Such disturbances will be represented
as latent variables. Once we acknowledge the existence of latent variables
and represent their existence explicitly as nodes in a graph, the Markov
property will be restored. (Pearl [2009], p. 44)
To retain the connection with autonomous mechanisms and intervention there is the
implicit assumption that one could (in principle, if not in practice) always intervene on
these latent variables in order to empirically verify the correct causal structure.
Let us take a step back, and look at two general features of this formalism. Firstly,
what are the points of contact between such causal models and the world? Roughly
speaking there are two: the data that underlies the variable ‘values’, and (in the case
where interventions are possible) the data that we use to characterise the local
interventions. It is worth noting here that both kinds of data are not explicitly included
in the final model: it is the axioms of probability theory that connect the data instances
to the final model.
The second important feature to note is that the twin assumptions of the causal
Markov Condition and faithfulness provide a means for associating observational data
to causal structure, but don’t always result in the discovery of a unique DAG.12
Crucially, the equivalence set of causal structures generated under these assumptions is
deemed causal by virtue of the underlying interpretation: autonomous causal
mechanisms exist that (i) generate the conditional distributions, and (ii) can be
modified through external intervention. On this view, there is only one correct causal
structure: the one that is, in principle, verifiable via local interventions (Korb [2006]).
Given classical causal modelling methodology, we can now suggest some desiderata
we may wish a quantum causal modelling framework to satisfy:
12See (Zhang and Spirtes [2015]) for some examples.
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1. The formalism should allow for the discovery of causal structure from empirical
data. At a minimum, such discovery should be possible using interventionist data
(data instances where local events are under external control). It would be an
advantage if causal structure could also be discovered in situations where
interventionist information was incomplete.
2. All correlations between empirically derived data should be accounted for via
notions of direct, indirect or common cause relations, i.e. there should be no
‘unexplained’ correlations. In situations where all correlations between empirically
derived data can not be accounted for via direct, indirect or common cause
relations, there should exist a method for extending the model to include possible
unobserved, or ‘latent’, nodes in order to account for the correlations.
3. Classical causal models should be recovered as a limiting case of quantum ones.
3 What’s the (quantum) problem?
In general, philosophers take Bell inequality violating correlations to be the focus point
for discussions about quantum causation. Although the physical setup of the Bell
experiments are relatively straightforward, a great deal of controversy surrounds the
appropriate way to interpret the empirical results. These experiments were inspired by
Bell’s theorem, originally presented in his 1964 paper (Bell [1964]), and written in
response to Einstein’s 1935 thought experiment (Einstein et al. [1935]). Roughly, the
EPR argument was presented as a reductio: if one assumes locality (space-like
separated systems cannot influence each other), completeness (quantum mechanics is
descriptively complete, and reality (as described below), then, coupled with the
empirical results of quantum experiments, one arrives at a contradiction. The reality
assumption was defined as follows:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty
(i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then
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there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical
quantity. (Einstein et al. [1935], p. 77)
For Einstein et. al., quantum mechanics refers to such elements of reality via the so
called ‘eigenvalue-eigenvector link’: an eigenvalue of a quantum system prepared in the
relevant eigenstate will result in an outcome that can be predicted with probability one.
In the face of the trilemma, EPR advocate we give up completeness, in order to save
locality and reality.
Bell’s theorem (in its various forms, see Bell [1964], Bell [1971] and Bell [1976]) can be
understood as refuting this move. The standard interpretation of Bell’s various writings
then (in the philosophical literature, at least) is that any theory that can account for
(i.e. explain) the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics must be non-local. So,
roughly, one faces a choice between giving up locality or giving up explanation.
Bell wrote many papers regarding the philosophical consequences of quantum theory,
and much ink has been spilled over the various philosophical assumptions and
implications of his work.13 The recent fifty year celebrations of his famous 1964 paper
have inspired another burst of academic activity, and this work suggests that it is not
entirely straightforward to gauge exactly what Bell meant by his various
characterisations of locality and local causality. Indeed, intelligent and careful analysis
has resulted in (sometimes alarmingly) disparate positions (see, for example, Werner
[2014a], [2014b]; Maudlin [2014b], [2014b]; Wiseman [2014], [2015]; Norsen [2015]). I
suspect this reflects, to some extent, that Bell recognised the philosophical di culties
that confound a precise characterisation of both causation and causal explanation, and
was honest about his various qualms. Broadly speaking, his work shows that the
connections between the various concepts involved (e.g. instantaneous
action-at-a-distance, locality, local causality and agency) are far from obvious.
For our purposes, it is relevant to consider some of Bell’s comments in light of our
13For a comprehensive collection of Bell’s papers, see ‘Speakable and Unspeakable in
Quantum mechanics’ (Bell [1990]).
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characterisation of interventionist causation in Section 1. Most pertinent are two of his
later papers: ‘The theory of local beables’ and ‘La Nouvelle Cuisine’ (Bell [1976] and
Bell [1990]). I take the view that these papers nicely capture the elements of
interventionist thinking that often underly our intuitive notion of causation and causal
explanation.14 Bell’s notion of ‘local causality’ (and, indirectly, causal explanation) is
first introduced in ‘The theory of local beables.’ This paper is also where he generalises
his approach to include stochastic theories, which is the setting on which we shall focus
here.15 In part, the aim of this paper was to make explicit some notions that Bell felt
were already implicit in ordinary quantum mechanics. The job of his ‘beables’ was to
recast quantum mechanics in terms of the physical properties with which we are already
familiar, rather than the more abstract Hermitian operators associated with quantum
observables. Bell suggests such beables should satisfy a number of desiderata, but most
importantly beables should correspond to something ‘physical’, in order to distinguish
variables that can be associated with ‘real physical’ values from those that pertain to
abstracta. For Bell, the latter ought to be excluded tout court from any causal
considerations.
As an example:
The beables must include the setting of switches and knobs on experimental
equipment, the currents in coils and the reading of instruments. (Bell [1976],
p. 57)
Of particular concern are local beables: variables that can be assigned to a particular
space-time region. Local causality is then defined with respect to such local beables.
14The details I present here are simply those that most closely align with
interventionist causation, for a more detailed analysis of these papers see, for example,
those papers cited in the previous paragraph and (Brown and Timpson [2014]).
15See (Brown and Timpson [2014]) and (Wiseman and Cavalcanti [2015]) for a
discussion on the relationship between the deterministic background assumptions of
(Einstein et al. [1935]); (Bell [1964]) and this later work of Bell’s.
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Figure 1: Bell correlations A and B are beables associated with space-like separated
regions 1 and 2, N denotes a complete specification of all the beables belonging to the
overlap of the backward light cone of the two regions, O andM refer to the beables in the
remainder of the two light cones for the two regions associated to A and B respectively.
Prima facie, the idea of beables aligns fairly nicely with Pearl’s causal relata: classical
random variables.
Bell goes on to define local causality in terms of these beables by introducing his
famous factorisability condition. Consider two space-like separated beables, A and B
associated with space-like separated regions 1 and 2. Let N denote a complete
specification of all the beables belonging to the overlap of the backward light cone of 1
and 2 (Fig.1). Let O and M refer to the beables in the remainder of the two light cones
for A and B respectively. Then, if one assumes that the joint probability
(A,B|O,M,N) factorises into (A|O,N)(B|M,N), one can use expectation values to
derive an inequality (a version of the CHSH inequality), which is violated by quantum
mechanics.16 For Bell, this factorisation property “says simply that correlations between
A and B can only arise because of common causes N”. For many, factorisation here just
is Bell’s notion of local causality.
The overall idea then, is that even by adding in putative hidden beables that may
exist in the joint past of beables A and B, one still cannot explain their correlation in
16An example of this is considered below.
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locally causal terms. Thus the ‘incompleteness’ escape from non-locality suggested by
EPR is blocked.
In the final section of ‘The theory of local beables’, Bell considers that despite the
suggestion that nature is causally non-local, we nonetheless cannot use such
non-locality to signal faster than light. By separating beables into two classes, those apt
for human manipulation (e.g. settings) and those that are not manipulable (e.g. the
outcomes), he shows that in “this human sense relativistic quantum mechanics is locally
causal” [p64]. That is, according to quantum theory we are forbidden from
manipulating one variable to induce changes in a di↵erent, space-like separated variable.
Of course, this ‘human sense’ of causation is pretty close to what interventionists use to
characterise causal relations. Although, as we saw in section 2, it is not simply a matter
of changing one variable here, and seeing if another variable changes there, but rather
causal relations are thought to be relative to a number of other specific assumptions.
In the closing paragraphs of ‘The theory of local beables’ Bell reminds us of one
further assumption required to derive the inequality: marginal independence of the
settings.
It has been assumed here that the settings of instruments are in some sense
free variables - say at the whim of the experimenters – or in any case not
determined in the overlap of the backward light cones. Indeed, without such
freedom I would not know how to formulate any idea of local causality, even
the modest human one.
For the interventionist, such ‘free variables’ correspond to intervention variables. The
key point is not that they are somehow uncorrelated with anything, but rather that
they are not directly correlated with any variables in the model other than their causal
target. Woodward’s four criteria for an ideal intervention (Woodward [2003]) and
Pearl’s ‘surgical interventions’ (Pearl [2000]) neatly capture this requirement.
It should, by now, be fairly obvious that several of Bell’s 1976 assumptions fit nicely
with the interventionist framework of Section 1. Interestingly, his concerns regarding
the a priori distinction between ‘controllable’ and ‘uncontrollable’ variables and also his
15
worry that causation may require a notion of agency are still live debates in the
interventionist literature per se (for example, see (Price [2013]); (Woodward [2015]);
(Ismael [2015])). It is intriguing that such concerns, at least in the context of
interventionist causation, seem to be pertinent to characterisations of causation, rather
than due to the peculiarities of quantum mechanics.
Also relevant for our current purposes, is the final caveat Bell adds regarding his own
particular characterisation of causal explanation:
Of course, the assumptions leading to [the inequality] can be challenged.
Equation 22 [factorisation] may not embody your idea of local causality.
You may feel that only the ‘human’ version of the last section is sensible and
may see some way to make it more precise.
The causal modelling formalism of Costa and Shrapnel [2016] is an attempt to pursue
this route. The more precise ‘human’ version of causation is a generalisation of
interventionist causation, that allows for the use of representational devices that go
beyond the more familiar classical random variables. Whether this requires one to
abandon the notion of ‘beables’ will be addressed in due course.
We next look at a specific example of the CHSH inequality to bring the association
between Bell’s characterisation of local causality and modern interventionist causal
methods into sharper focus. Two parties are able to perform local measurements on a
physical system received from a distant source. The same source is used for the systems
received by both parties, and the two systems are emitted simultaneously. The parties
randomly choose from one out of two possible measurements A and B (the ‘settings’).17
These measurements reveal one out of two possible outcomes, labelled X and Y . A
latent variable   represents the physical conditions in the shared past of the two
systems. A first pass at a plausible DAG structure might be that of Figure 2. The two
wings are set up to be space-like separated, so the omitted edges between (i) the
17Some authors consider the three setting case, others consider the two setting CHSH
inequality. The di↵erences are irrelevant for what I say here.
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outcomes, (ii) the settings, and (iii) each setting and its opposite outcome are (in the
first place) assumed due to relativistic constraints.
X
A
Y
B
 
Figure 2: A possible DAG for the Bell experiment. A and B are random variables
representing the settings at each wing, andX and Y are the random variables representing
the corresponding outcomes.   captures the physical conditions occurring in the joint
past of the two systems (initiated from the source).
For the interventionist, the aim is to produce a causal DAG that can explain the
correlations between the variables. There are two possible avenues to pursue. One can
postulate a plausible graph structure (as in figure 2) and check if the experimental data
does in fact display the statistical patterns implied by the graph. That is, that the
distribution is Markov and faithful to the graph. Alternatively, one can start with the
empirical data and use the statistical patterns to construct the appropriate graph.
Glymour [2006] was the first to analyse the Bell correlations in terms of the CMC
and faithfulness. He argues that constructing a causal graph that satisfies the CMC not
only forces one to accept fine-tuning of the causal parameters, but also to accept that
the fine-tuned causal influences in question can violate relativity. Broadly speaking,
Glymour’s position is to advocate a re-think of the Causal Markov condition.
Wood and Spekkens [2015] have also recently analysed the Bell correlations using
classical causal modelling methodology. For these authors, a key message is that any
causal model that reproduces the observed statistics of the Bell correlations must be
unfaithful (equivalently, fine-tuned). Using only marginal independence of the settings
and no-signalling as input to Pearl’s discovery algorithms, Wood and Spekkens [2015]
(henceforth WS) show that even if one allows for the existence of latent variables, one
must permit fine-tuning of the causal parameters to both explain Bell inequality
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violations and still observe the no-signalling conditional independencies. In this case,
applying the principle of faithfulness to the observed independencies implies the lack of
superluminal causal influence that is the hall-mark of Bell’s local causality.
A very nice feature of this paper is that the authors are able to show that several
popular interpretations of quantum mechanics postulate fine-tuning in order to explain
the Bell correlations: de Broglie-Bohm theory, superdeterminism and retrocausal
interpretations all require fine-tuning of one sort or another. Additionally, it seems clear
that in such cases there are no known local interventions that can break the fine-tuning
and discover the ‘correct’ causal structure. Thus, such interpretations cannot be
considered to give a causal interpretation of the Bell experiments in the interventionist
sense.18 Finally, Wood and Spekkens note that their no-go result only holds in the
framework of classical causal modelling. The take home message, therefore, is that one
ought to reject the framework of classical causal modelling, in particular the use of
random variables for common causes and the use of classical probability theory, in
favour of an explicitly quantum generalisation.
On the strength of such work, Naeger [2015] advocates we give up faithfulness in
order to provide a causal explanation for the Bell correlations. In contrast to Glymour
[2006], Naeger suggests that rather than giving up on the CMC in the face of the Bell
correlations, the better approach is to accept fine-tuned causal models. Recall, however,
in Pearl’s formalism, faithfulness only carries weight as a restriction on Markovian
models: if we give up Markovianity we lose the value of faithfulness into the bargain. If
we give up faithfulness wholesale, we lose the possibility of causal discovery. It seems
neither approach a↵ords us a causal explanation worthy of the title.
All three of these modern takes on causal explanation take the position that the data
gathered in the Bell experiments ought to be thought of as observational : we lack the
right kind of interventionist access and so must fall back on the usual CMC and
18Of course, if new experimental evidence comes to light that violates no-signalling,
then these results will need to be reconsidered. For many, including myself, this seems
rather unlikely.
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faithfulness constraints in order to tell a causal story about the correlations. The causal
modelling framework of Costa and Shrapnel [2016] takes a quite di↵erent route. By
starting with plausible notions of interventions and causal mechanisms, that are
inspired by the way physicists represent manipulation of quantum systems, they build a
theory of quantum interventionist causation from the ground up. Their models satisfy
the desiderata of Section 1., and as classical causal structure is recovered in a suitable
limit, one is not forced into relinquishing classical interventionism, with all its intuitive
appeal.
4 Quantum causal models: why bother?
At this point it is worth pausing to consider why we should wish to characterise
quantum causal models. Apart from foundational concerns, is there likely to be any
pragmatic advantage to the overall project? After all, the philosophical value of causal
modelling is almost always defended on pragmatic grounds. And the situation in the
special sciences seems, prima facie, quite di↵erent to the situation in physics. In the
special sciences we typically wish to use causal discovery because we have incomplete
knowledge of the relevant laws (if indeed such laws exist). For example, we wish to
know whether smoking causes cancer, whether inflation causes economic depression,
whether increased carbon emission causes climate change. In contrast, for quantum
systems it seems we do in fact posses the required knowledge: given initial states, the
Hamiltonian for the system and the Schrodinger equation, can we not calculate exactly
how things will behave? It would seem that any information gained via causal
modelling would, in some sense, be redundant.19
There is an important misconception that lies at the heart of this objection. That is,
the idealisation of a closed system, for which we can give a perfect Hamiltonian
representation and evolve initial states according to global law. It is important to
remember that for many real world applications, such an idealised situation is fiendishly
19Thanks to an anonymous referee for identifying this issue.
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di cult to achieve. We typically assume that there are no initial correlations between
the environment and the system of interest, and furthermore that the environment does
not act as a ‘memory’ for the duration of the experiment under consideration. Perfectly
isolated experiments where one knows (and can control) all the causally relevant
degrees of freedom (i.e. one does not have to contend with potentially causally relevant
noise) is certainly the exception, rather than the rule. Open quantum systems research
recognises this fact, and it is no accident that the causal modelling formalism presented
here uses the language of this field. Condensed matter physics, quantum information
and quantum technology all utilise systems that comprise many degrees of freedom,
with many and varied interactions. Identifying when a system has a Markovian, causal
representation is often a di cult task. So in a sense, discovery of causal relations in the
special sciences and in physics is perhaps not so di↵erent after all. In both situations,
causal modelling is useful when we have a multitude of interacting components with
only limited access and control.
The second point of note is simply pragmatic. As engineered quantum networks
become increasingly complex, the task of characterising the order in which quantum
events take place will become increasingly important (and di cult).20 Current
tomographic methods do not provide a method for determining such an order: if one
does not know a priori whether one has measurements on two halves of a bipartite
system, for example, or on a single system at two distinct times, then one does not
know whether to apply state or process tomography. By contrast, the Quantum Causal
Modelling framework works in the absence of such knowledge.
20Classical distributed computing currently uses specific protocols to keep track of the
order between local operations (e.g. Lamport time-stamps and vector clock methods).
We currently have no analagous methods for characterising the order of quantum
operations.
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5 Markov Quantum Causal Models
The notion of quantum intervention used to define the Quantum Causal Models (QCMs)
of Costa and Shrapnel [2016] matches the way certain physicists represent manipulation
and control of quantum systems. Thus the central claim of interventionist causation is
retained: the quantum causal models help identify the manipulable elements of the
world. From here, they build up a theory of quantum causal structure in much the same
way as Pearl builds a notion of classical causal structure. The mathematical structures
of this theory are not the joint and conditional probability distributions of Pearl’s
formalism, but rather those utilised by quantum open systems research.
The QCMs are defined by sets of possible spatio-temporally local quantum operations
(graphically represented as nodes) and sets of quantum channels that represent the
causal influences acting between the nodes (graphically represented as edges). Causal
structure can be discovered using a general notion of intervention which is defined as a
choice of a quantum ‘instrument’ (a particular set of quantum operations). Using these
objects one can define direct, indirect and common cause relations. One can also show
that by defining a quantum Markov condition, it is possible to identify when a causal
graph is incomplete, in the sense that there is an unmodelled (latent) common cause.
Extending the model to include such nodes restores the Markov property to the causal
graph, and an analogue definition of faithfulness is also possible. Finally, it is also
possible to recover classical causal structures, as a limiting case where all local
operations are diagonal in a fixed basis.
These definitions are all fairly technical, and to the uninitiated rather daunting.
Rather than simply reproduce the results of the paper here, I shall try to focus on those
di↵erences between the classical and quantum causal modelling formalisms that are
likely to be of most interest to philosophers (but see Appendix A for technical
definitions and Shrapnel [2016] for a more detailed philosophical presentation).
It is most instructive to compare each of the components of the QCM formalism to
its classical counterpart. For classical models, each variable (graphically, node)
represents a possibility space, defined by a set of possible values or events. For the
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quantum models, the nodes are also associated to a possibility space, although in this
case defined by a set of completely positive maps (CP maps).21 Each map can be given
a classical label and for a single run of an experiment a single map is assumed to
represent a quantum event occurring in the spatio-temporal region associated to the
relevant node. These maps provide a possibility space for the many ways a quantum
state may change as a result of a local intervention.
In the classical case, interventions can be ‘ideal’, where a single value is chosen with
probability one, or ‘generalised’, where the intervention rather induces the value to
respond in a probabilistic manner. Such ‘probabilistic choosing’ more accurately
represents intervening in most experimental situations, where perfect control is merely
an idealisation.22 In the QCM framework, interventions correspond to this more general
kind: an intervention chooses only probabilistically among a set of CP maps (in
quantum information language, an intervention corresponds to a ‘quantum
instrument’). Such quantum interventions are associated to completely positive trace
preserving maps (CPTP maps), formed by summing the individual CP maps. The
trace-preserving property is due to the fact that we assume that with certainty at least
one of the events represented by a particular CP map will occur.
The story already seems to involve quite a departure from the classical causal
modelling paradigm. In the QCM formalism we assume that all quantum events are
associated with a change or process (CP maps are used to characterise evolution of a
quantum state). It is not obvious how one ought to relate this to the classical idea of
values or events determined by the kind of ‘passive measurement’ assumed in Pearl’s
formalism. It seems plausible however, to consider that even classical measurements can
be considered as resulting in a process, or change in the state of the system being
measured. Advances in the philosophy of measurement theory suggest our epistemic
access to measurement outcomes is a rather convoluted and model-based a↵air. We
21Note, individual CP maps need not be trace-preserving.
22Korb [2006] calls such interventions ‘imperfect’, Pearl [2000] calls them ‘generalised’.
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ought not to think of measurements as simply providing an outcome that is directly
isomorphic to an underlying physical state. As Tal [2013] reminds us, “measurement
consists of two levels: (i) a concrete process involving interactions between an object of
interest, an instrument, and the environment; and (ii) a theoretical and/or statistical
model of that process, where “model” denotes an abstract and local representation
constructed from simplifying assumptions.” Associating events with possible processes
rather than static values is perhaps not as counterintuitive as at first it may seem.23
Recall, for classical causal models, the edges of the causal graph correspond to the
causal mechanisms responsible for determining the statistical correlations that exist
between events at di↵erent nodes. In the quantum causal models, we assume the
functional relationships between the nodes are determined by quantum systems passing
between di↵erent spatio-temporal regions (nodes), possibly interacting with an unknown
environment. In accordance with classical models, we call such functional relationships
quantum causal mechanisms and depict them graphically via edges. Such connecting
mechanisms are also represented via CP maps that sum to CPTP maps (although in
this case there is a slightly di↵erent representation, amounting to a partial transpose).
In the classical case, autonomous causal mechanisms are considered to be responsible
for the probabilistic correlations of a causal network, and it is the autonomy of the
mechanisms that allows for the possibility of so-called ‘surgical’ interventions. This
leads us to consider the relationship between interventions and mechanisms in the
23This is somewhat related to the question of whether there is either a ‘realist’ or
‘operationalist’ stance in lurking in the background of the QCM formalism. In terms of
standard conceptions of the terms, the formalism most naturally fits within an
operationalist paradigm. The quantum interventions are most easily understood as
being associated with choices we make in the lab, and we do not make use of the
eigenvector-eignavalue link. Having said that, one is also free to understand the CP
maps as attaching to single quantum events, and so understood from the perspective of
a process ontology, it may well be possible to consider the QCMs as a↵ording a kind of
realist interpretation.
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quantum case. A deterministic quantum mechanism in this formalism would correspond
to a unitary map, relating the output space of one node to the input space of another.
Recall in the classical case any unmodelled noise is assumed to be uncorrelated, thus
ensuring the autonomy of the mechanisms and underpinning the relevance of the Causal
Markov condition. In the quantum case, external noise leads to the use of the more
general CPTP map, rather than a unitary map to represent the mechanism.24
Using these basic ingredients, Costa and Shrapnel [2016] are able to build an
interventionist theory very close in spirit to the classical interventionist theory of Pearl.
Discovery of causal structure from empirical data is made possible via a quantum
Markov condition and a requirement of faithfulness that is analogous to the classical
version. Importantly, it is also shown that classical causal structure (with the usual
screening o↵ properties) can be recovered by assuming local operations to be diagonal
in a fixed basis. There is, however, nothing in the paper to suggest what drives such a
limiting case:
Whether this condition is enforced by decoherence (Zurek [2014]), collapse
models (Ghirardi [1985]), ‘fuzzy measurements’ (Peres [1992]), or in other
ways, will not be discussed here. Rather, it will be shown that, provided the
transition to classicality takes place, Markov quantum causal models reduce
to classical ones.
6 The Bell experiment
The formalism of Costa and Shrapnel [2016] is designed to define causal relations
between multiple quantum systems of arbitrary dimensions. As such, when applied to
the Bell correlations, the results seem almost trivial. The experimental statistics will
decompose according to the Quantum Causal Markov Condition to satisfy a simple
24One can also use CPTP maps to describe irreducible noise such as that arising in
dynamical collapse models. We do not need to commit to that particular interpretation
here.
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common cause structure. There is no causal relation between the wings of the
experiment, but rather the source acts as a common cause. Whilst it is tempting to
argue then, that Costa and Shrapnel have developed somewhat of a sledgehammer to
crack a nut, without a formalism that generalises to multiple systems of arbitrary
dimensions, one would be hard-pressed to claim that it is a complete causal theory that
can provide adequate causal explanations.
7 Bell’s objections
Now we have a basic understanding of the formal structure of the quantum causal
models, we can review some philosophical implications. For many, the key question is
whether the models do in fact provide a causal explanation for the Bell correlations.
Recall the historical trajectory:
1. EPR suggest that quantum correlations force a choice between non-locality
(causal influence between space-like separated events) and completeness,
2. Bell shows that if causal influence is defined along classical interventionist lines,
adding further hidden variables does not circumvent the need for non-locality:
that is, one cannot save locality by assuming incompleteness,
3. Wood and Spekkens show that even if one allows for non-local influences, the
resulting causal explanation is flawed (due to the presence of fine-tuning). One
cannot save causal explanation by allowing for non-local causal influences.
The quantum causal modelling framework presented in (Costa and Shrapnel [2016])
assumes it is the characterisation of causation and causal explanation that is at fault,
and seeks to provide an alternative. The alternative presented is complete, in the sense
that all empirically derived statistics can be explained by common cause, direct cause or
indirect cause relations. If such an explanation is not possible, then this signals the
existence of hidden causes and an extended model that does correctly characterise the
empirical statistics can be formed. The formalism recovers the classical modelling
formalism as a limiting case, thus we do not need to entirely give up on the
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interventionist account, with all its intuitive appeal. Rather, it is seen as an
approximation of something deeper.
Regarding locality, direct causal influence in these models is always consistent with
relativistic constraints by virtue of its consistency with quantum mechanics. Thus,
empirically derived statistics can always be explained using such models without
postulating non-local causal influence (direct causal mechanisms acting between
space-like separated regions).
From the perspective of the Bell literature, there are some obvious objections. Recall,
Bell was uncomfortable with including a ‘human’ element within an account of
causation: correctly capturing possible signalling relations did not seem, for Bell, to be
an apt characterisation of causation. We saw in Section 1 that this charge has also been
levelled at interventionist accounts of causation: whether interventionist causation
reduces to agency is a hotly debated question. The interesting point however, is that
this problem does not seem to be peculiar to the quantum characterisation. It seems to
me that one could argue against the need for agency along exactly the same lines as the
standard interventionist response (Woodward [2003]). That is, we observe certain
regularities in experimental situations (where we have an element of control) that allow
us to infer particular causal relations between naturally occurring events (which we do
not control).
The question of how the QCM’s relate to Bell’s notion of beables is less clear.
Certainly, the models are connected to empirical evidence gathered from “the setting of
switches and knobs on experimental equipment, the currents in coils and the reading of
instruments.” However, if Bell’s aim was to use beables in order to expunge the use of
any mathematical representational devices that move beyond classical random
variables, then clearly the QCM’s fail in this respect.
As I see it, if one believes that interventionism is the correct way to think about
causation, then the empirical results of quantum experiments force one of three choices:
(i) dub the quantum world as mysteriously acausal, (ii) abandon the interventionist
account as the preferred account of causation and look for an alternative causal theory
26
that can explain quantum correlations, or (iii) generalise the interventionist account so
that it can account for both classical and quantum causal relations. The QCM’s of
Costa and Shrapnel [2016] represent an attempt at the third path.
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8 Appendix
The following definitions are taken from (Costa and Shrapnel [2016]). For a more
comprehensive list, with illustrative examples, see both (Costa and Shrapnel [2016]) and
(Shrapnel [2016]).
Definition 1. Quantum event
A quantum event is represented by a completely positive (CP) map M : AI ! AO,
where input and output spaces are the spaces of linear operators over input and output
Hilbert spaces, AI ⌘ (HAI ), AO ⌘ (HAO), respectively. Note, a CP map can be
represented as a matrix by using the Choi-Jamio lkowski isomorphism:
MAIAO =
P
j l |lihj|AI ⌦
⇥M(|jihl|)AO⇤T , (3)
M(⇢)AO = ⇥trAI  ⇢AI ⌦ 1AO ·MAIAO ⇤T , (4)
where {|ji}dAIj=1 is an orthonormal basis in HAI and T denotes transposition in that basis.
Definition 2. Local region
The space of potential events is called a local region and is identified with the set of
CP maps between an input (AI) and an output (AO) space, which is isomorphic to the
space AI ⌦ AO. Input and output spaces can be identified with the past and the future
space-like boundaries of the space-time region where the event takes place.
Definition 3. A quantum causal mechanism maps the output space of a local
region to the input space of another one. The analogue of a deterministic mechanism is
a unitary. External noise can be described by an interaction with an environment which
is then traced out: the most general definition of a mechanism is a CPTP (completely
positive trace preserving) map.
Definition 4. A quantum intervention represents the collection of all possible events
that can be observed given a specific choice of probing the system. An intervention is
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defined as a choice of quantum instrument. For a local region AI ⌦ AO, an instrument
is a set of CP maps that sum up to a CPTP map:
J =  MAIAOx  mx=1, MAIAOx   0,
trAO
mX
a=1
MAIAOx = 1
AI .
(5)
(The trace-preserving condition for the sum guarantees that probabilities sum up to 1.)
Definition 5. Quantum Process Rule
To describe an experiment consider a set of local regions L = {Lj = Ij ⌦Oj}nj=1,
representing n disjoint space-time regions, each bounded by two space-like surfaces. In
an individual run of an experiment, instruments J L11 , . . . ,J Lnn are implemented in these
local regions and the corresponding events recorded. The events are described by CP
maps ML11 , . . . ,M
Ln
n . It is possible to prove that the probability for such events to occur
is given by the Quantum Process Rule (Oreshkov et al. 2012, Shrapnel and Costa 2017):
P (ML11 , . . . ,M
Ln
n |J L11 , . . . ,J Lnn ) = tr
⇥
ML11 ⌦ · · ·⌦MLnn ·WL1...Ln
⇤
, (6)
where WL1...Ln   0 is called the process matrix and represents the information about the
outside world available in the local regions.25
Definition 6. Given a set of local regions L = {Lj = Ij ⌦Oj}nj=1and a process matrix
WL1...Ln, a region Lh represents a direct cause for a region Lk 6= Lh if, for any
possible set of instruments
n
J Ljj
o
j 6=k
, there exist instruments J Lkk and fJhLh such that
P (MLkk |J L11 , . . . ,J Lkk , . . . ,J Lhh , . . . ,J Lnn )
6= P (MLkk |J L11 , . . . ,J Lkk , . . . ,fJhLh , . . . ,J Lnn ). (7)
Definition 7 (MQCM). Given a set of local regions L = {Lj = Ij ⌦Oj}nj=1, a Markov
quantum causal model (MQCM) is a pair hG,W i, where
25This rule is also known as the generalised Born rule.
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1. G = hL, Ei is a DAG that has the local regions as vertices;
2. to each edge e 2 E is associated a space Se such that Oj =
N
e2outj Se,
j = 1, . . . , n, where
outj := {e 2 E|e = (Lj, Lk)} (8)
is the set of edges departing from the vertex Lj;
3. W is a process matrix of the form
WL1...Ln =
nO
j=1
T
PSjIj
j ⌦ 1OD , (9)
where OD :=
N
k2D Ok is the output space of the regions with no outgoing edges,
D := {k|outk = ?}; PSj :=
N
e2inj Se is the parent space associated with region
Lj, with
inj := {e 2 E|e = (Lk, Lj)} (10)
the set of incoming edges to Lj; and
T
PSjIj
j   0, trIj T PSjIjj = 1PSj , j = 1, . . . , n. (11)
Definition 8. Latent regions and extended models
A local region in which the events are not observed will be called latent. A
Markovian causal explanation for a process matrix WL1...Ln is an MQCM
D
G,fWE,
where G is a DAG with vertices containing L1, . . . , Ln, and possibly latent regionseL = nL˜1, . . . , L˜mo, such that
W = tr eL
h
C L˜11 ⌦ · · ·⌦ C L˜mm ·fWL1...LnL˜1...L˜mi (12)
for some CPTP maps C L˜11 , . . . , C
L˜m
m , where tr eL denotes the partial trace over all the
regions in eL. W is called reduced process matrix and provides a full description of the
physical situation for the observed regions, once the instruments in the latent regions are
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fixed; fW is an extension of W .
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